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
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The attached Troop Topic, **THE PRIMACY OF THE SOLDIER IN MODERN WAR**, is furnished for use by commanders in support of the Army Information Program Objective: The soldier is the indispensable element of the defense of the Nation ... (**THE SOLDIER IS TOPS**).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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- 1 Incl
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of the Soldier in
Modern War"

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
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ALEXANDER NICOLINI
Major, Infantry
R&D Coordinator

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY TROOP TOPIC

Headquarters Third United States Army
Information Section

THE PRIMACY OF THE SOLDIER IN MODERN WAR

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Much has been said regarding the role of the soldier - the basic fighting man - in modern war, but few, perhaps, have said it better than Mr. William Courtenay, O.B.E., M.M., British Infantry Soldier and Royal Air Force pilot turned War Correspondent.

In speaking to officers and enlisted men in the Third, Fourth, and Sixth United States Army areas; before audiences of the 12th Air Force; and at the Virginia Military Institute, during the period February - July 1959, Mr. Courtenay emphasized the primacy of the soldier in past and future campaigns to include the Korean conflict; British-Malayan operations; British "brush-fire" operations in Southeast Asia, Israel, Cyprus, the Aden Protectorate, etc.; and in a hypothetical World War III.

This Troop Topic draws largely upon the experiences of Mr. Courtenay as related by that eminent soldier-traveler-lecturer during his 1959 tour of the United States.

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THE PRIMACY OF THE SOLDIER IN MODERN WAR

The individual soldier as basically a fighting man is not going out of business with the introduction of guided missiles, rockets, and other of the new post-war developments which suggest we are entering an era of "pushbutton warfare". All experience is to the contrary.

The possibility of a third World War rests as an uneasy thought in the backs of the minds of all in this generation, yet it may well be that we will never have to face World War III if we stay strong and united and do not permit our armed forces to degenerate during this period of cold war and restless peace. Any potential enemy would certainly measure itself against the strength and daring of a strong, determined Army made up of strong, determined men, and think twice before engaging such a foe.

The individual soldier is the primary weapon of a strong Army.

COMBAT-READINESS AN ESSENTIAL

The old saying: An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, holds true in modern war. Good defense is an effective prevention measure, but the defense can be no better than the individual soldier who sustains it.

It is tremendously important that all soldiers be taught, no matter what arm of the service they enter, that they are primarily soldiers of the line, that they are fighting men, and that each of them has an infantry role to play quite apart from the specialized role to which they may be assigned or which they may prefer. It is more and more important, as new weapons and new vehicles enter the service of the Army, that every man should understand, fundamentally, that he is a fighting man.

With the coming of the helicopter, and a little later on the flying jeep and other small, exciting vehicles which will enable the soldier to leap off the ground or to follow the contours of the countryside, no longer being tied entirely to the ground for his vehicular traffic, the Army will have to become more and more specialized, and every soldier will have to know more of the operation, care and maintenance, and driving or piloting of these vehicles in addition to his normal role as a fighting man. It becomes; therefore, very important, as the newer vehicles enter the service, that every man who is a specialist in the care and maintenance of these vehicles, or in the driving or flying of them, should keep in sight the fact that he is fundamentally a fighting man and that all of these other specialized roles, no matter how intricate or how important, are simply superimposed upon his role as a fighting man.

The fact that he is in uniform at all should be the first consideration of any soldier to impress on him that he is a fighting man. One example of this comes from the role of the soldier as the electronic specialist in a NIKE battery. Today these batteries are scattered around many vital targets. They are to be found around our great ports and harbors like

San Francisco and Los Angeles, and are there in defense, in depth, throughout the United States. They occupy a good deal of land. The great radar antennae may be sighted, perhaps on hills, and the batteries of missiles may be sighted two miles or more away from where they are controlled. There is a cable line in between the weapons and the radar control which flies them by remote control. With the battery and all its personnel and equipment scattered over such a large area, some plan for the defense of the battery site becomes essential.

If an enemy decided to stake everything on one great blow against the United States in a great atomic war and upon the cast of that die lay the whole of the enemy's future, it would be evident that they would stop at nothing to achieve their end, once their plan went into operation. Clearly, then, no enemy could rely simply on sending bomber aircraft over America to effect one massive, knock-out blow. They might well rely on a certain amount of sabotage inside the country to be carried out by groups secretly organized beforehand, with their efforts directed toward coordinated action with the air strike.

One can imagine, for instance, a situation in which, just as the bombers were taking off from enemy bases, infiltrators, saboteurs, and guerillas dressed in civilian clothes, well-organized for the task (having made a complete reconnaissance of the area for many months beforehand) organize themselves to strike at NIKE batteries in order to render them ineffective by the time the enemy aircraft reach their targets. We must be prepared for such coordinated strikes and be ready to deflect them.

Under such circumstances, a force of guerillas or infiltrators could cut the cables between the batteries and the radar stations on the hills from whence orders to fire are transmitted. At the vital moment, for an hour or two preceding the arrival of enemy bombers, the cable would be out - there would be no time to repair it, and the battery would become ineffective. A battery might even be rushed and some of the personnel disabled. In such event, it would be quite useless for men dashing out of their huts to try to explain to the infiltrators or enemy raiders that they are electronic specialists and not soldiers at all. It would be useless to claim immunity from attack on such a basis, for in this grim circumstance nobody would be immune from attack for a moment.

All this means; therefore, that even in the NIKE batteries, everyone must learn a defensive role. It would be a great mistake for the crew of a NIKE battery, around New York, in the Canal Zone facing South America, on the Pacific Coast, or even in the North, in Alaska facing the cold Pacific or the Arctic region, on duty day after day, month after month, to hold the view that they are simply there to wait for the enemy to bring a war to them, and that if enemy aircraft does not appear within range of their weapons then there is nothing for them to do. It could be that, knowing the accuracy of the weapons and the constancy of the state of alert, the enemy would not risk the bombers coming in until everything was first coordinated on the ground to destroy the batteries or render them ineffective.

The role of the specialists, then, is the defense of the NIKE battery sites, and they are no less fighting men than if they were on a distant battlefield away from the home front. It would be foolishness for NIKE battery personnel to rely entirely on some battle group suddenly rushing to their assistance to defend them under such circumstances, because ground troops might not be near enough to them to effect a rescue.

These specialists, trained for a defensive role, must be ready to defend their battery sites as well as fire the guns. They must perform the basic soldiers' role on the defense perimeter, practice it frequently, and be constantly alert against infiltrators on the ground or treachery from within.

It can readily be seen that the infantry soldier's role applies here to many individuals who consider themselves "specialists" and not fighting men at all.

The primacy of the soldier in defense has been well demonstrated by British operations in Hong Kong where ordinary sentries perform outpost duties facing a hostile front. Opposite Hong Kong Island, Britain holds a piece of the mainland of China. South of it, at Kowloon, is British territory, and has been for over a century. There is an airstrip where the Royal Air Force operates. In addition, there is a great new airstrip, 8,600 feet long, which has been built like a pier into the water from the mainland of China into Kowloon Harbor. Completed in September 1958, it accommodates prop-jets, jet liners and all the other great airliners of the Pacific. Boeing and Douglas jets will ultimately operate there. But beyond this territory, still deeper into China, England holds a piece of Territory 20 miles wide, or deep, on one side of the channel of water which is Victoria Harbor. Hong Kong Island is on the other side. By holding the land on both sides of the waterway, the passage is clear for the shipping of the world to use in a peaceful, lawful manner, without the risk of interference from insurgents, guerillas, or revolutionaries on the mainland. This territory, known as the "New Territory", beyond the little holding of the British at Kowloon Harbor, was leased, in 1896 from the Chinese government of that day, for a century. In 1996, it must be returned to the China government in control at that time. Beyond this territory, the British face the Chinese communist army.

When the communist forces gradually moved through the whole of China and caused the retreat of Chiang Kai-Shek's forces to Formosa, they moved down into the south until they reached the little British holding of 20 miles' toe-hold on the mainland of their country. There the British had barb-wired their positions and stationed a division of troops, with infantry, tanks, and artillery. When the Chinese communists reached the barbed wire they realized that here was a strong, dependable force, and decided they had enough to do subjecting the whole of China for many years without trying to tackle the British as well. They have respected the British holdings ever since.

This little holding on the mainland of China, to a depth of 20 miles, is only 22 miles wide from coast to coast, across a little peninsula. On the right of this little peninsula there is a small mud village called Choh Toh Kok. The left hand side of the main road of this little village is the British line and the right hand side of the road is controlled by the communist forces. The garrison line runs right down the main road of the village. On one side of the road, then, there is a British sentry walking up and down under a Union Jack; on the other side of the road a Chinese communist sentry marches up and down under the red flag of communism. They have been marching up and down this road every day since 1949, without any untoward incident. It works quite well. And yet this could be the most explosive point in the whole of China. What does it depend on? It depends on the bearing, the military discipline, the self-discipline and the fire-discipline of these infantry soldiers on the outpost duty, facing a hostile territory containing 500-million people. The soldier is the diplomat representing his country; more important, even, than the gentlemen of the diplomatic corps who reside three or four hundred miles behind the lines in the capital.

The soldier is the only one the enemy sees, and what the Chinese people will know of his country depends upon their judgment of this man on sentry duty. Upon his bearing and soldierly qualities may rest a good deal of the defense of the free world. He is the man, who, if he is trigger-happy, could start something which he could not stop. He must be prepared to face it all and take it all - the laughs, the jeers, the accusations, even the hostile attitude of the citizenry - as he walks his lonely beat. Even in an unfighting role, the soldier has a vast responsibility upon his shoulders.

KOREA, A FIGHTING MAN'S WAR

The conflict in Korea taught us many lessons pertaining to the basic soldier, and pointed up the fact that he is a prime factor in every possible circumstance of war. One of the first lessons learned as a result of the Korean engagement was the importance of training the soldier, from his very first days, to realize the primacy of his role as a fighting man.

If the young man coming into the service is taught that to serve in the Army is a great honor, and that to wear the uniform is a great commitment, then he will accept the training and discipline that goes with the job. The whole end and aim of all training and discipline in the conservation of lives in battle so that a hill may be taken or an enemy division overcome and the battle won with a minimum of casualties.

In Korea we faced an enemy who had been well-trained for his job. The communists had raised, trained, and equipped an Army of North Koreans 200,000 -strong. They had given them support training in mountain warfare, and brought them up with tough communist discipline.

In all the training which takes place in an army, it is well to watch what the business competitor is doing. War is a business like any other business, and consequently, what the competitor is up to - his methods of doing business - must be watched carefully from day to day in order that they can be circumvented. The enemy entered the campaign in Korea as a

highly cohesive, well-trained, toughly disciplined force which understood everything there was to know about mountain warfare. Therefore, it behooved American soldiers to perform against them as a highly-skilled, well-trained professional force, in order to cope with the situation.

The men had to learn to march and accept march-discipline and the route march as a normal, standard part of their job; not only for the infantry soldier, but for every soldier in every specialized role. Many thought that through the use of vehicles the role of the soldier on a route march was a thing of the past, but nothing could be further from the truth. In many cases, columns of soldiers in vehicles wound around the hills of Korea without picketing the heights on either side of the route (an infantry soldier's job). The result was that the enemy, knowing the country - well-trained at the top - could place an ambush ahead the leading vehicle, a roadblock behind the rear vehicle down the winding, hairpin bend, and he had caught a column that was quite unable to go forward or backward.

When a fusillade of fire would be opened up from both sides of the hill on the helpless, stationary columns of vehicles, everyone had to clear the vehicles, take to cover, and shoot their way out of trouble. At this moment, everyone in the columns became infantry soldiers: The men moving up in vehicles to the front line, the gunners who had hitch-hiked rides to rejoin their batteries, the cooks and bakers who had thought their jobs were to prepare meals, the drivers of the vehicles, and all of the specialists who were moving up to perform their specialized tasks somewhere near the front. Every man became a fighting man, with rifle or pistol, or, if necessary, with rifle and bayonet; they had to form a line, shoot their way out of trouble, and get the columns on the move again.

The men learned that in mountainous countries such as Korea, it is essential to picket the heights in order to control the valleys. This is an infantry soldier's job - to climb laboriously up the hills and high mountains with a pack on the back, and to hold the heights and look down on the valleys. In Korea we learned that if you are on top of the hills you are monarch of all you survey; you will never be ambushed, never surprised, if you hold the heights. This is a toilsome job involving marches up to the hilltops, and often, mad scrambles with no other aid than stout sticks and with heavy packs and weapons on human backs for usually, wheeled vehicles cannot climb the heights.

In Korea this meant that the infantry soldier had to be fit to undertake this job, and every man had to be an infantryman. It meant that the cooks must climb the hills to prepare the food for the men. It meant that the medics must climb the hills to bring down the wounded. It meant that almost every soldier at some time or other, no matter what his primary job, had to climb those hills, and keep himself physically fit for such climbing. The soldiers had to learn to live on the hills, fight on the hills, bivouac on the hills, and by moving along the hilltops from both sides of

the road, control the valleys down below to avoid ambush. That was the reward. The roads had to be kept clear so that the guns, the tanks, the heavy vehicles, all the equipment which must keep to the road and which had to come up to support the infantry, were enabled to move without the risk of ambush or of being trapped by road mines.

All of the foregoing underscores the importance of the route march, and of the soldier in every branch being kept physically fit to march with a pack on his back, as soldiers have throughout every previous age before the coming of the automobile. It emphasizes the importance of not being deluded into thinking that with the coming of vehicles, and later on with the coming of helicopters and flying jeeps, the days of the route march are over.

The route march is one of the finest forms of breeding companionship in the Army because on a hike or route march lasting 20 to 30 miles in a day, everyone starts out equal, everyone is carrying the same pack, everyone's pack is equipped with exactly the same gear, and all start out swinging along the road or over the hills and dales singing together a soldier's song. This breeds a companionship of the march which invisibly and almost spiritually knits the soldiers together into a compact, disciplined, proud unit. As the march proceeds and the sweat and weariness come, the winding columns march at ease, conserving their energy for the final hours. There comes a moment to all men, late in the day, when they feel physically unfit for more, but then comes that great fight of the spirit over the flesh to stick it out - to sweat it out - that has so often tipped the scales in favor of victory over defeat in battle. It is with a sense of victory and accomplishment that the marchers swing into camp, a very fine outfit, at the end of the march. The spirit has triumphed over the flesh, and the comradeship bred through the sharing of the common dangers and difficulties of the march has visibly knit the unit together and turned it into a good fighting outfit in a manner which could never have been accomplished had the soldiers rode the route in separate vehicles.

Korea was a fighting man's war - not a "pushbutton" affair. It was the soldier, not the vehicle or the bomb, that won the day.

WAR IS ALWAYS WITH US

The history of the last few centuries reveals that there is always a war, however small or remote it may be, going on somewhere in some part of the world. Since World War II something like 19 distinct campaigns have been fought in different parts of the world. There have been, in addition to Korea, campaigns in Malaya, in Cyprus, in the Aden Protectorate, in Israel, in India and Pakistan, to say nothing of the various communist campaigns in such places as Indo-China and Tibet.

It is most important that we take a very balanced view of the role of the individual soldier in small wars. It would be a great mistake if all of our thinking and energy were directed entirely to the possibility of a third World War to the exclusion of all other types of military operation.

In all of the operations from 1945 to 1959, there have been no atom bombs, no rockets except a few fired from aircraft, no "science fiction", no "pushbutton warfare". All of the "small wars" have been fought by the individual soldier; for the most part marching, crawling, fighting every inch across terrain where wheeled vehicles very often could not move. These men have fought across the sort of terrain where the use of atomic weapons would not have been possible or desirable - in the hills of Korea, the jungles of Malaya, the rain forests of Kenya, across mountain ridges in Cyprus, or in little bits of sawtooth desert in the Aden Protectorate of Arabia. In every one of these small wars, except, perhaps, in Korea, there would have been no point in using the great blasting effect of atomic weapons since there were no worthy industrial, transportation or other vital targets to hit, and the expenditure of these very costly weapons and of their ammunition would scarcely have been justified.

While the United States has not, to date, been actively engaged in any of these post-war small wars - "brushfire" campaigns so to speak, there are many lessons which could be learned from studying the experience of other nations who have been so engaged.

These experiences reveal that even in small wars, the soldier, the basic fighting man, is a better fighting machine than any vehicle or weapon, no matter what may be invented.

If we take a look at one of the campaigns where the British, Australian, and other British Commonwealth troops have had considerable experience in the last 10 years, we will find an example of how the basic soldier has proved his worth in small wars. This operation is the Malayan Campaign. It will be found that what is true of the experiences of operations in Malaya holds good for every other type of campaign that may be experienced in South-east Asia.

We are a part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization - that is, America, England, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand - and the whole aim of SEATO is exactly the same as the aim of NATO in Europe: To provide a battle line, if necessary, to prevent the encroachment of communist forces upon the Free World. The encroachment of communism upon the small nations of Southeast Asia will certainly be pressed if SEATO forces are absent from these territories.

Since all of these territories are very much alike, whether it be Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, or Indo-China; all are jungle countries just like Malaya, and the rules of war which apply to Malaya apply equally to every one of the others. The lessons learned in the Malayan campaign are applicable to every one of these jungle territories in Southeast Asia where American, British, and other SEATO forces may some day find themselves engaged in stemming communist efforts to bring the whole of the Far East within their sphere of influence.

Malaya contains three million Malays - Mohammedan people. They are the natives to whom the country actually belongs. In addition to these, there are about three million Chinese, some 100,000 Hindus, and a few other groups from various countries in the Far East. The Chinese in Malaya, for the most part, are descendents of those who drifted down from China to live in Malaya under Queen Victoria's reign. A hundred years or more ago many of them preferred moving down into Malaya and living under the protection of the British flag to remaining under the squeeze and corruption of Chinese war lords and the Chinese Empire. In Malaya, as good business men, they could set up businesses; they could buy land and operate rubber plantations and tin mines just the same as the British.

These various Asiatics fared very well: They never had to serve in the armed forces of the Crown, they were never attacked, they were protected for a century by the Royal Navy and the British Army. They were allowed, in addition to owning land, to educate their own children; run their own way of life as Chinese, or Hindus, or whatever; and amass fortunes.

For the most part the Chinese in Malaya have been very loyal to the British Crown, and many of them call themselves "The Queen's Chinese". They have become an English-speaking people. There have been some Chinese; however, who have turned communist, and in 1948 - just after the end of World War II - about 10,000 of them took to the jungles with the idea of driving the British out of Malaya by guerilla tactics. They operated simply by wrecking the railways, ambushing vehicles on the road, assassinating the managers of rubber plantations and tin mines, and intimidating the thousands of rubber tappers. In the latter case, they would waylay the workers as they went to and from their work on the plantations and make threats against them or their relatives in an effort to ruin the industries. Since the economy of Malaya is based on rubber and tin, these Chinese felt that if the plantations and mines were not worked, the British would be forced to leave Malaya and the communists would inherit the country, erase White China, and substitute their own form of government in Malaya and Singapore.

Wealthy Chinese firms were pressed to provide funds for the communist party, both in Malaya and Singapore. In the villages where the communists could gain the upper hand (there were not enough police or soldiers in the area at the beginning to protect all of the outlying villages), the people were pressured to provide recruits for the communist platoons. They were squeezed for food, medical supplies, and even military intelligence against the British. Food for the guerillas was being secured from Singapore and other cities and was being silently smuggled into the jungle and deposited in food dumps. Rice sacks and other food supplies were secreted all over the states of Malaya. Once the food problem was solved, the communists believed that they could put a full scale guerilla war into action.

Two things always go hand in hand in this type of warfare: When the enemy starts eating well, the situation reports become alarming; the number of guerilla incidents on the railways, the roads, the rubber estates and the tin mines will run into hundreds per week - when a food blockade can be effected and food denial made perfect, the guerillas have a job to find their food and they have to spend so many hours looking for food that they have less time to fight; and situation reports drop accordingly. Food denial, then, is one type of defense against guerilla warfare.

In Malaya, when the first trickle of information began to come in from jungle police posts, the British began to lay ambushes for the communists, and plans began to take shape for the cutting of the communist food pipelines and the enforcement of a food blockade.

The most effective weapon, of course, was the soldier - the individual infantry soldier. An organization was formed called the SAS - Special Air Services. Its members were infantrymen, both British and Malay; and all were volunteers. This group was given paratroop training and then flown into the jungle areas by planes of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Royal New Zealand Air Force.

Wherever the presence of food dumps was known or suspected, the men would parachute into the tops of the jungle trees, cut their parachutes loose, leave them on the trees and drop by rope to the jungle bed. In every case, these men went in in small force, usually no more than a hundred men. There would be, perhaps, a young second lieutenant just out of the Royal Military Academy in charge, with a buck sergeant to back him up. These men would carry the responsibility of looking out for the whole platoon. When the aircraft departed, the small force would be on its own.

The first operation, of course, would be the preparation of a firm base. The soldiers would clear a space in the jungle so that supplies could be dropped to them, and then they would begin to move out on daily patrols, like the spokes of a wheel, in all directions. The primary purpose of such patrols was to seek out and destroy, if possible, the communist food dumps.

These platoons, which stayed in the jungle for as long as 30 days at a time, were fed and supplied entirely from the air. The aircraft would fly over the jungle at given times of the day. The officer in charge of a platoon would send up a puff of white smoke when he heard the aircraft approaching or when he knew the hour to expect it, and the pilot would make the puff of white smoke rising above the jungle trees his aiming point. The supplies would be delivered, but in those days, it was done under difficult circumstances.

Usually the only planes available were C-47s or planes of similar type which were never designed, of course, for this type of operation. The pilot would sometimes have to make several runs in like a bombing run, at treetop level, in order to make sure that he would get the supplies into the small base clearing. If supplies fell even as little as a half mile away from the clearing, it would take a day's march of slashing through the jungle to get

at them. (In future jungle wars it is anticipated that such supply jobs can be accomplished by helicopter.) The aircraft would; therefore, do a run-in - a dummy run-in first - then would be pulled up on its nose to almost stalling speed while the supplies were cast out by a jump master, just as though he were dispatching troops. All of the supplies needed for the day would be dropped: Food, ammunition, drinks, matches, cigarettes, mail from home, newspapers, uniforms, medical supplies, everything. Day after day, for thirty days, the dropping would continue.

When the platoon on the ground had found its quarry, had perhaps dealt with a bandit patrol, or found food dumps and destroyed them, then the men had to thrash their way out of the jungle to the nearest main road where vehicles would be waiting, by prearranged plan, to carry them back to their regular base.

One of the most remarkable things about the fighting man is the fact that when he is on the job his morale is high - and the tougher the odds the higher his morale. The soldier appreciates all of the adventitious aids given him in camp, but he doesn't require them when he faces the pace of a tough job with a small platoon in the heart of a jungle. Faced with an unseen enemy, perpetual gloom, wild animal and leeches, and long days of bashing about in the jungle, the soldier is quite content to do without the "props" given him in garrison towns or camps. The amazing thing about it, in Malaya, was the fact that almost without exception, as soon as the soldier had had a bit of rest and relaxation, he volunteered to return to the jungle.

The determination of the soldier to seek and wipe out enemy supply dumps began to pay dividends. There came a time when the communist guerillas were spending about 80% of their time looking for food, and only 20% fighting the SAS troops.

In the depths of the Malayan jungle where white men have scarcely ever dared to venture, there are thousands of small people - a race of true aborigines which probably inhabited the jungles even before the coming of the Malays. These people are about four-foot, six-inches high, or less. They roam about the jungle in G-strings, armed with blowpipes and poison darts. Expert marksmen with these primitive weapons, they can bring down a bird from a hundred-foot height when he is on the wing. Everything they need is in the jungle. They build their little homes on stilts alongside the rivers, and they plant gardens where they grow corn, sweet potatoes, taro, bananas, etc.

As food supplies became scarce for the communists, they were forced to retreat deeper and deeper into the jungle until finally, they entered the territory of the little jungle folk.

The guerillas set about to compel the small people to grow food for them in their gardens, and soon the communists, with food again available, were back in business as terrorists.

At the beginning of 1953, the terrorist incidents on the situation report again rose to alarming numbers. There was consternation in the general headquarters of the British Army at Kuala Lumpur, the Malayan capital -- it was obvious that the communists were getting food again, but where?

It was imperative that the rubber and tin industries in Malaya be preserved since they played such an important part in Britain's economy. In addition, while a synthetic substitute for rubber had been successfully developed in the United States, there was no natural or synthetic substitute for tin, so if the Malayan supplies were cut off by the communists, not only Britain, but America and all of the other countries of the West would be seriously affected. Further, it was of vital importance that these resources be denied to the communists.

The British leaders were convinced that the local population knew who the leaders of the communist movement were and who the terrorists were; that they knew of their disposition and the families from which they had been recruited. The British were aware that, basically, the natives wanted a Western power to be paramount among them. Yet the Queen's Chinese, the Hindus, and the Malays simply sat on the fence and refused to divulge what they knew. (This silence - this reluctance to take sides - is typical of all of the peoples in Southeast Asia, and is indicative of what may be expected of them in any future military situation in the area.) It appeared that all of these people wanted the government forces to win, but with the communists so widely scattered among them, they were taking no chances of bringing enemy vengeance upon their own heads.

The British were, therefore, faced with a big problem, not only in their military campaign, but in the field of intelligence as well. The natives knew who and where the communists were, but would not divulge this information unless they were sure of a government victory -- but no such victory could be achieved by the government unless they could locate the enemy. It was a vicious circle, brought about by the placidity of the local people. They did not rise up in anger with a sense of outrage, as would have been done in America or England, to denounce the petty tyrants making up the communist faction. Rather, because they had never known liberty as it is understood in the West, they practiced a form of neutrality that denounced neither the communist spies in the villages nor the government agents seeking them.

The British learned in Malaya that before they could hope to secure the loyalty of all of the people in an emergency like this guerilla war, that they must first of all give them protection. Yet this must be done without a declaration of martial law in the country or without waging war against any particular section because the ultimate aim in Malaya, as it would be in any other Southeast Asian country, was to get all of the various elements of the country to work together: Malays, Chinese, and Hindus, in this case, so that when the war was over all elements could come together again to form a sound government.

Although the bulk of the terrorists in the Malayan jungle were Chinese, the British government forebore to declare war on the Chinese population in Malaya or in the adjacent island of Singapore because to declare war would have made bad blood. Bad blood drips down through the history books, and looking ahead, the British realized that if they wanted to win these people over and reconcile them to work together to run their own country as a democracy, it would defeat this purpose to declare war on any one element.

As a result of this policy, the individual soldier in the Malayan campaign was, for a while, fighting with one hand tied behind his back. There was never any martial law for the ten years of this campaign in Malaya. Sometimes, even when Chinese terrorists were caught in the jungle, as long as they were not caught carrying arms, instead of being taken as prisoners of war they could appeal to a civil court and hire a good Chinese lawyer to get them off. This very often happened, much to the chagrin of the soldiers. Just imagine a military campaign in which the prisoners you capture could appear before the civil court, hire a lawyer, get themselves off and then return to the other side to resume the fighting. This was the situation in Malaya, and it all helped to make the soldiers' task more difficult. It required great discipline, great self-discipline, and great forbearance, on the part of the army to operate this way so as to avoid making bad blood among the Chinese population whom they were trying to win over to work with the Malays when the guerilla war days were finally over.

From all of this, one can readily see that there are times when the basic soldier must also be a good statesman and a patient diplomat.

Meanwhile, the search for the source of communist food supplies went on, despite the lack of adequate intelligence reports. At the end of 1953, the British brought in a squadron of Royal Navy Sikorsky S-55 helicopters. These were to be used in what was now known to be a necessity: A mile-by-mile search of the entire jungle.

Helicopter search teams were made up of three or four persons and they covered those areas of the jungle, moving right in above the treetops, that had previously been considered inaccessible.

British infantry soldiers, continuing their marches into the jungles, clearing out bandits and keeping down food dumps, now were also doing something else: They were clearing swathes in the jungle to create what were called "LZs" and "DZs" - Landing Zones and Dropping Zones - on primary jungle. The soldiers would cut down the trees, make a clearing, then the helicopters would come in above the treetops (very often the rotor blades pushing the branches), descend vertically like an elevator, downward among the giant trees, and land right on the jungle bed. They would evacuate the sick and wounded, which was one tremendously important advantage over the previous practice of carrying casualties from the jungle.

The helicopters would bring in the supplies, but most important they could begin to get among the little jungle folk. As the soldiers began to carve out these LZs and DZs, deeper and deeper into the jungle, they were

gradually opening up the jungle like a book, and what had been for countless ages dense, impenetrable forest now began to provide room for maneuver. Hundreds of these little landing zones and dropping zones were created all over Malaya.

Throughout all the territory of the little aborigines, the British began to identify the tribes and locate the little villages. As they run the helicopter strips closer and closer to the villages, soon small army spotter planes could land also. Police posts were set up and the task of winning the confidence of the little people was begun. As they learned the principles of government and found that the government could help them, the jungle dwellers were won over, and they began to deny food supplies to the communists.

This action forced the communist guerillas to the final phase of the blockade, which was to move into still deeper jungle, away from the villages which they had previously dominated but now feared. They were compelled to grow their own food, which was a very difficult process since they had very little in the way of tools and equipment, and since they had to rush in, create clearings so the sun could get through, plant their meager bits of land to corn and sweet potatoes, then leave them, to return some four months later and gather what harvest there was.

These Chinese communist guerillas had been well indoctrinated in the importance of building citadels in the jungle; well-defended forts surrounded by their own gardens so that they would be self-sustaining. Such forts were to have been safe from attack, on good defensive positions, with avenues for watching out for the approach of government patrols. From such safe places, theoretically, they could perpetually sally forth to raid roads, railways, rubber plantations and tin mines. But they never got the program off the ground. They were never able to build even one of these citadels.

In the final phase of the Malayan campaign, in 1956 and 1957, as the food blockade tightened around the communists, there were several squadrons of helicopters in use. The team could go in and destroy the food dumps, put down poisoned weeds, and what they did not destroy the wild animals of the jungle consumed. The last remnants of the communist guerillas, many thousands of whom had been slain in hand-to-hand combat with British army patrols, began to surrender because they were hungry.

By the end of 1958, the war in Malaya virtually came to an end. The military situation has now cleared up sufficiently to confer independence upon the people. The long-sighted policy of avoiding a declaration of war against any section of the community, of not declaring martial law, and of not interfering with the daily lives of the populace is paying off.

Where does the primacy of the soldier fit in all this? It was the basic fighting man who won the campaign. In the first years - 1948, 1949, and 1950 - the jungle sweeps were made by small platoons of soldiers working through dense, putrid, sweaty jungle along the Equator. They would seek out and engage the communist patrols, and exterminate them or take them prisoner. The soldiers activated and implemented the food blockade.

The coming of the helicopters into the jungle areas in no way detracted from the primacy of the soldier. Not a weapon even though it was armed, the helicopter only enhanced the effectiveness of the soldier on the ground. Essentially a vehicle, just like the jeep, the helicopter provided greater mobility for the soldier and enabled him to exploit the element of surprise. It also helped to keep the soldier more physically fit and fresh to jump right into the fight by cutting down on the long, exhausting jungle marches.

The pattern laid down by the British forces in the Malayan campaign could well be followed by American, British, French, and other SEATO forces if they ever have to fight together in Southeast Asia. The use of helicopters will expedite the action, of course, but the basic use and mission of the soldier will remain the same. He will march toward the enemy, come to grips with him, and overpower him by engaging in all of the good infantry practices of cover, good fire discipline and fire control.

THE ROLE OF THE SOLDIER IN AN ATOMIC WAR

Everyone is concentrating a good deal of thinking on the question of atomic war today because of the overshadowing dangers of a world conflagration. This is another type of conflict in which the basic soldier would have an important role to play. It is true that if we were to become involved in a great atomic slugging match with some foreign power, the first phase of the haulocast might last only three or four days. But if this WERE to happen, the role of the individual soldier would become more important than ever; first, in the field of war - and second, on the home front.

A good deal of modern military training revolves around moving soldiers in small formations, in vehicles immune to radiation; training for a war in which there would be no great fixed battle line with flurried ranks of troops presenting massed targets, but rather, in which small concentrations of troops, highly mobile, would form the units for operation. In such a war, all the qualities which are trained into the private soldier: Individual courage, initiative, bravery, and above all, resourcefulness, would come into play. Under such circumstances, we can imagine a small squad or platoon cut off from its neighbors on either flank, with communications severed for many days, operating perhaps under a junior officer or an NCO, maintaining themselves in the field, feeding themselves, restoring communications - and still retaining their fighting qualities just as though they were still operating under their usual commander. Such a unit would have to be able to harass the enemy, stay in business, and link up with those on either flank of them gradually. This is the role of the soldier in the field.

In an atomic war situation, there would certainly be a great task for the soldier on the home front. It is quite possible that occupying enemy territory would not be the most important thing for the first few years, but that the great task would be to occupy our own cities. If a large number of cities and vastly populated areas were struck all at once by atomic blasts, someone would have to move in and occupy them right away to prevent - first of all - the looting which might occur, human nature being what it is. Looters could move into devastated areas and at once begin to pick up everything that

wasn't nailed down. This is as bound to happen as if there were suddenly a police strike and no law and order left in a town, and all the dark, submerged underworld would come suddenly to the surface and help itself to anything that could be found in shops or in private homes. The soldier's role in this case would be to prevent looting, protect the women, gather up the children, round up the stragglers and begin the processes of restoration to normalcy.

Soldiers would probably be called on to do all of the things which an army normally does when it effects a beach landing - when the beachhead has been secured, when the fighting moves beyond the perimeter, and the garrisons begin to arrive to occupy the territory. When we contemplate the nature of the immense task which would lie before us if a city were devastated, or if 20 or 30 centers of population adjacent to aircraft plants, munitions works, or other works associated with military production were suddenly destroyed in one awful blow, it will be seen that this would be far too great a task to be left to a few civilian workers, all anxious to help but few ever trained to command, and fewer still trained to give instant obedience.

Authority would have to be given to a force in uniform, easily recognizable, for obviously that is the only kind of force which would be obeyed during the first days, weeks or months of such a situation. Such a force can only mean the Army because only the Army is trained to command, and in such circumstances, the making of polite requests would not be sufficient. The force in charge must be able to give orders, issue commands, and enforce immediate obedience to both. Although martial law is not desirable in most cases, events in an atomic war could prove that with a great breakdown of communications on a vast continent, martial law would HAVE to be initiated.

Even if everything were left under the civil authorities as the final arbiters, and martial law were not invoked, it would still be necessary to utilize the services of the Army in all its specialized tasks: Infantry, Signal Corps, Engineers, Transportation Corps, to name a few.

It is evident that if we become involved in an atomic war, even apart from the question of fighting - still in the field, if that be possible - or apart from any question of occupying the enemy territory, the great problem of occupying our own country would become of paramount consideration. The country which first restores its communications, binds up its wounds, restores normal life to its cities, brings back trade and turns the wheels of industry again will be the first to return to world leadership.

In the role of rehabilitator, the Army would have a tremendous task before it, and by its identity and by its discipline, by its willingness to accept the responsibility, and its faculty for obeying orders without question, it would be judged by the civilian population.

In the final analysis, in case of atomic warfare, it is the individual soldier, working on the ground: Patrolling, building, protecting, firm in his obedience to orders but gentle in his treatment of the lost and bereaved, who would earn the undying gratitude of future generations of Americans for the role he played in time of world catastrophe.

SUMMARY

✓ All of the foregoing lends emphasis to the proper training and discipline of the man in uniform, and to his vital importance in modern warfare, whether he is going to be involved in an atomic war or a small brushfire campaign.

As new weapons and vehicles come into use and the Army becomes more and more mechanically-minded, every man may have to learn a certain number of new techniques of an engineering and mechanical nature. But through it all, regardless of how much specification may take place, basic soldiers are the standard-bearers for their country and upon their shoulders rests the nation's confidence in a secure future.

PRESENTATION POINTERS

Presentation of this Troop Topic should be informal, with a view to arousing interest and enthusiasm. The recurring theme that the soldier is tops should be strongly emphasized.

Maps should be used, if available, to point out the settings of war situations, international boundaries and brushfire campaign areas.

Sub-topics may be presented individually; e.g., "War Is Always With Us," with a brief participation discussion between each one.